Low cost carriers, secondary airports and State aid: an economic assessment of the Charleroi affair by Cristina Barbot
Research – Work in Progress – nº159, October 2004
FEP WORKING PAPERS   FEP WORKING PAPERS  
Low cost carriers Low cost carriers, , secondary airports  secondary airports 
and State aid and State aid: : an economic  an economic 
assessment of the Charleroi affair assessment of the Charleroi affair
Cristina  Cristina Barbot Barbot
CETE  CETE - - Centro de Estudos de Economia Industrial, Centro de Estudos de Economia Industrial,
do Trabalho e da Empresa do Trabalho e da Empresa
Faculdade de Economia do Porto   - Rua  Dr. Roberto Frias - 4200-464  - Porto  -
Portugal  Tel . (351) 225 571 100 - Fax. (351) 225 505 050 - http://www.fep.up.pt  1
Low cost carriers, secondary airports and State aid: an economic 
assessment of the Charleroi affair* 
 
Cristina Barbot 
CETE/ Faculty of Economics of Porto 
Address: Faculdade de Economia 
Rua Dr. Roberto Frias 4200 PORTO PORTUGAL 
Email: cbarbot@fep.up.pt 
Keywords: Low cost carriers, airports, airline competition, State aid 
JEL Classification: L93 
Abstract 
 
In this paper a vertical differentiation model is built in order to analyse the effects of 
subsidies to secondary airports, or of lower prices set by them, on the competition between 
LCC’s and FSC’s. The Ryanair/ Charleroi agreement is used as an example and as a basis for 
the  model.  The  main  findings  are  that  subsidisation  (or  lower  airport  charges)  benefits 
consumers and negatively affects incumbent airlines. However, they may be more affected by 
competition than by the subsidy. An empirical analysis provides a few insights on LCC’s 
price  strategies,  namely  that  they  retain  rents  resulting  from  lower  aeronautical  fees  on 
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1.1. Low cost airlines and secondary airports 
 
When Ryanair first set its home base at Dublin Airport, it probably faced difficulties 
concerning the availability of slots, congestion and high aeronautical charges. By the time it 
established other European bases, such as Paris Beauvais and Brussels Charleroi, Ryanair 
chose secondary airports in order to avoid this kind of obstacles. So did other low cost carriers 
(LCC’s), as EasyJet at London Luton.  
Two main characteristics make secondary airports attractive for LCC’s: the existence 
of idle capacity and location. 
Many secondary airports were built in order to serve regional flights from hub airports 
to small or medium size towns. The frequency of these flights is low, and they were not used 
for other purposes. For instance, the airport of Orio e Serio was probably due to link Bergamo 
with Rome, but until the arrival of LCC’s, no one would imagine it could be a base for 
connections  between  Milan  and  London.  Others  were  former  military  basis  that  were 
progressively  abandoned.  Then  these  airports  were  built  with  excess  capacity,  and  their 
marginal costs were near to zero. Before the establishment of Ryanair, Glasgow Prestwick 
airport’s capacity was used in 1%, and Charleroi received about 20 000 passengers a year, 
which is an average of 54 passengers a day (European Commission, 2004).    
For  LCC’s,  this  is  an  important  advantage  for  a  few  reasons.  First,  there  are  no 
problems with the availability of slots, which allows LCC’s to design schedules in order to 
make the best use of their fleet. Second, congestion is absent and this makes possible to 
follow schedules in time and avoids costs of delays. Third, marginal cost is zero, and so 
aeronautical charges may be very low. And, fourth, infrastructures like check in counters and 
handling systems were practically inexistent, which makes it possible to design new ones that 
are simple enough to fulfil LCC’s purposes. 
Location is another advantage. The distance from secondary airports to the cities they 
serve are larger than those of main airports. Passengers face longer surface journeys to and 
from the city centre. But, unlike customers of FSC’s (full service carriers), those of LCC’s are 
ready for these longer journeys, as their main focus is on price (Poungias, 2003). The location 
advantage may come from lower wages and more labour availability, together with the fact   3
that these regions often face unemployment problems, and region authorities are willing to 
promote employment through the airport’s expansion.  
With excess capacity and unemployment, secondary airports and their surrounding 
regions’ authorities are perfect partners for LCC’s, as the lowering of aeronautical charges 
may be in interest of both. The result of this association has been successful, and if LCC’s 
leave,  for  any  reason,  as  it  happened  in  Clermont  Ferrand  with  Ryanair,  traffic  decline 
strongly concerns local governments. 
The establishment of LCC’s increased so much the traffic in secondary airports that it 
lead to a transformation of their infrastructures, while assuming a new role and receiving a 
new kind of passengers.  
 




Source: Airports’ and airlines’ websites 
 
 
Table  1  displays  some  characteristics  of  secondary  airports.  Some  of  them  are 
dominated by one airline, and so become more vulnerable to changes in the airline’s network 
strategy. Ryanair is dominant in most of the airports presented in the table, being almost a 
Management/ Concentration                  Main destinations
ownership (nºof flights)
(majority) % of main airline Other secondary Regional 
RYANAIR Hub airports airports airports
Charleroi Private/Local 89,7% 31,0% 38,0% 31,0%
Beauvais Local/ Local 84,4% 16,7% 83,3% 0,0%
Ciampino Private/ Private 63,3% 23,1% 23,1% 53,8%
Stansted Private/Private 24,8% 12,6% 8,7% 78,7%
Girona Public/Public 60,0% 0,0% 46,7% 53,3%
Hahn Private/Private 63,6% 6,5% 25,8% 67,7%
Orio al Serio Private/Private 35,0% 21,6% 24,3% 54,1%
Skavsta Private/Private 92,3% 0,0% 87,5% 12,5%
WIDEROE
Torp Private/Private 75,0% 30,0% 30,0% 40,0%  4
monopoly in Charleroi, Beauvais and Skavsta. In others, like Stanstead and Orio e Serio, there 
is no clear dominance by any airline.  
But do secondary airports effectively perform their role? Are they less expensive than 
hub airports? And, if so, can they offset eventual losses from aeronautical activities with 
revenues from concession ones?  
Forsyth  (2003)  analyses  the  question  of  lower  fares  and  concludes  that,  though 
secondary airports have economies of scale, there may be other factors that allow for lower 
costs. These factors include a greater efficiency, a lower quality service, and subsidies, among 
others. However, economies of scale derived from high fixed costs may not exist, as some 
capacity costs are often sunk.  
Lower airport costs should be combined with revenues from other activities in order to 
allow profits for secondary airports. Non-airside (or concession) activities often provide the 
main part of airport’s revenues. They generated from 40% to 80% of all revenues in 50 major 
world airports in 1999 (Oum et al. ,2003). Does the same happen with secondary airports? 
Although data is not available, it is known that their passengers usually have lower incomes 
and are more price sensitive. There are no connections and not so many delays, so the time 
spent  inside  the  airport  is  shorter.  Then,  they  should  not  spend  so  much  in  concession 
activities. On the other hand, the no frills system means that no meals are served on board and 
passengers should spend more in food and beverages. Besides, passengers face longer surface 
journeys and less availability of intermodal transport systems, which makes way for more 
expenses in car rental.   
Brussels South Charleroi Airport currently offers 136 flights (arrivals or take-off’s) a 
week, 89.7% of which are performed by Ryanair. It has several concession activities: three 
shops, of which one duty free shop, one coffee shop and car rental. The dominance of Ryanair 
makes the airport more sensible to the airline strategy.  
Flights  leaving  from  Charleroi  are  mainly  to  large  towns  (hub  airports  and  other 
secondary airports). These flights account for 69% of the destinations and for 76% of the 
traffic.  
 
1.2. The agreement and the issues  
 
The terms of the agreement are well known so they will be stated here very briefly, 
based  on  the  document  produced  by  the  European  Commission  (European  Commission, 
2004).  In  November  2001  the  Walloon  region,  owner  of  Charleroi  airport,  signed  an   5
agreement with Ryanair, stating special conditions for the use of the airport.  These conditions 
involved a reduction in landing charges, a fixed price of one euro per passenger for ground 
handling  services  and  a  financial  support  for  the  opening  of  Ryanair’s  base  and  for 
advertisement and other forms of promotion of Ryanair’s flights.  
Comparing with the amounts published by the government for regional airports, the 
reduction in the landing fees was of about 50% and Ryanair would only pay 10% of the 
published handling charges (European Commission, 2004).  According to the calculations of 
an anonymous interest party, the direct (airport) cost of departing from the Brussels region 
would reach 5 euros at Charleroi and amount to 32,14 euros at Brussels International Airport. 
The Commission decided to open a procedure on this agreement in the basis of Article 
87(1) of the Treaty, on the compatibility of State aid to firms with the common market rules. 
Article 87(1) states that “ Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted 
by a  Member State  or through  State resources  in any form whatsoever which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods  shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
common market”. 
In February 2004 the procedure was concluded and the reductions on landing and 
handling charges were declared to be incompatible with the common market, within Article 
87(1). 
Then, the main issue is about the statement that aid distorts competition, or, put in 
other words, that the agreement favours Ryanair and negatively affects other airlines that 
compete in the same routes. But who are the competitors? 
Table 2 shows that Ryanair has from zero to five airlines competing on its routes 
departing from Charleroi. As SN Brussels airlines did not exist by the time of the agreement
1, 
and as some of the airlines fly in code sharing, this number is reduced. Most competitors are 
FSC’s, but there are also other LCC’s.  
Certainly that competition may be extended. Flights from Charleroi can compete with 
flights from Paris or Amsterdam. In fact, Airfrance and KLM expressed comments as interest 
parties during the Commission procedure. So did Scandinavian Airlines, a direct competitor 
on the route to Stockholm. 
 
                                                
1 SN Brussels airlines started in February 2002. Most of its routes considered here as Ryanair’s rivals were 
opened in 2003.  Italian routes are flown in code share with Alitalia.   6






1.3. Purpose of the paper 
 
This  paper  intends  to  build  a  model  that  explains,  as  much  as  possible,  the 
implications and effects of State aid provided by the agreement between Ryanair and the 
Walloon region authorities. It is not at all concerned  with any critical assessment of the 
Commission’s decision.  Only economic and academic issues are expressed and analysed. 
However, the implications concerning the use of secondary airports by LCC’s and findings 
can be extensive to other cases. 
In order to avoid any judgements on the Commission’s decision, State aid is treated in 
the model as a subsidy to landing and handling charges supplied by the secondary airport. The 
subsidy may be paid by the airport or by regional authorities. Thus the model keeps adequate 
to analyse any case of a secondary airport used by a LCC, even without agreements and/or 
State aid, where the airport charges are lower than those of hub airports.  
The main issues analysed in the paper can be summarised as follows. 
1.  In the Commission’s report Ryanair states that the agreement allowed 
for an increase in all traffic. But if demand grows, how is this growth split between   7
the LCC and the FSC? In particular, will the LCC capture passengers that used to 
fly with the FSC, and /or passengers that otherwise did not fly at all?  
2.  It  is  obvious  that  the  subsidy  favours  the airline  that receives it. If 
services are homogeneous, it is also obvious that it affects the incumbent(s). But 
does  the  same  happen  when  there  is  vertical differentiation, or  when the new 
entrant is a LCC?  
3.  Ryanair’s  entry  in  the  market  creates  a  competitive  situation  and 
competition is welfare enhancing. In what extent are incumbents more affected by 
fair competition than by state aid to one LCC?  
4.  How  are  the  extra  profits  derived  from the subsidy shared between 
Ryanair  and  Charleroi  airport?  Who  benefits  more,  the  foreign  airline  or  the 
locally owned airport? 
Based  on  a  model  that  attempts  to  embody  the  main  features  of  the  situation  on 
analysis, this paper tries to provide insights on these issues. An empirical test on the eventual 
benefits that an LCC may get from its dominance of a secondary airport, and on their main 
sources of competition is presented in the final part of the paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the model is developed and the most 
important  findings  are  presented.  In  Section  3  the  empirical  analysis  is  detailed.  Some 
concluding remarks follow, in Section 4. 
 
2. The model 
 
According to the above considerations, in a particular route Ryanair (or any other 
LCC) may be a monopoly or else face competition from one or more airlines. This model 
considers the situation of a duopoly with one LCC and one FSC exploring traffic in one route. 
The LCC departs from a secondary airport, and the FSC from a hub airport. The two airlines 
compete  in  prices  and  supply  services  with  different  qualities,  and  this  is  an  important 
theoretical  feature  of  the  model.  Vertical  theory  differentiation  is  used  as  a  basis  of  the 
competitive  game  between  the  two  airlines.  The  incumbent  is  a  FSC’s  supplying  a  high 
quality service, while the new entrant offers a no frills service, or lower quality flights. The 
difference in qualities is set by a few items, such as seat density of aircrafts and the provision 
(or not) of food and beverages during the flights. The FSC and the new entrant’s relevant 
variables will be denoted by the subscripts 2 and 1, respectively, so that the former has a 
quality of q2 and the latter of q1.    8
Qualities are set previously to the game, and so they are exogenous variables. In this 
case, quality is associated to decisions concerning either fixed factors, like seat density or 
staff per passenger, or variable ones, such as the supply of food and beverages. It is supposed 
that there is no possibility of changing quality. In order to reduce the number of parameters, 
q1  is  normalised  to  the  unity  and  q2  is  equal  to  “a”.  Then,  “a”  measures  the  quality 
differential, a = q2/q1.  
The demand for flights is derived from vertical differentiation theory, as proposed first 
by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982), and using the simplified 
version of Motta (1993). A brief explanation is here provided for readers not familiar with this 
theory.  
Consumers are potential passengers uniformly distributed (along a line) according to 
their quality taste parameter, v, which is here set between zero and the unit. They may either 
buy one flight ticket or none. The parameter v expresses consumers’ utility of one unit of 
quality. A consumer who is indifferent between buying a low quality flight and not buying 
any flight at all has a value of v=v0 such that: v0q1–p1 = 0. For the consumer who values 
equally both services, discounted from prices, v=vt, with vt such that: vtq1 –p1 = vt q2 – p2. 
Demand for the high quality flights, y2, is computed by the difference between the 
highest value of v (v=1) and vt, y2 =1-vt. Demand for the low quality flights is the difference 
between vt and v0, y1 =vt-v0. The number of consumers who do not buy any flight at all is v0 - 
0. Solving for v0 and vt, and letting p1 and p2 stand for the tickets’ fares, these functions are: 
 
y1 = (p2 - ap1) / (a-1)  
y2 = 1 - ((p2 - p1) / (a-1))  
 
The airlines cost functions are supposed to be linear so that marginal costs are constant 
and set as costs per passenger. Costs are divided in two parts. The parameter H denotes costs 
(per passenger) originated by the payment of aeronautical fees, including the charges for 
landing and for ground handling. C stands for costs (per passenger) related to all the other 
inputs. As airline 1 is a LCC, its marginal cost is equal to bC, with b measuring the cost 
differential and b<1
2. The parameter b embodies some quality costs, which means that the 
LCC has lower costs because it may be more efficient, but mainly because it supplies a 
service with a worse quality. 
                                                
2 There are several estimates of the parametre b. As an example, ECA (2002) calculates an average cost per ASK 
of 10.5 eurocents for the three larger European airlines, and of 6.6 eurocents  for an average of three LCC’s.    9
The subsidy to the LCC on landing and handling charges is of (1-k)H per passenger, 
the airline paying the airport an amount of kH, also per passenger. The situation without 
subsidy is depicted by making k=1. 
The airlines’ profits are then expressed by: 
 
p p p p1 = p1 y1 – bCy1 – kHy1 
p p p p2 = p2 y2 – Cy2 – Hy2 
 
Price competition seems to be the most adequate choice for the game between the two 
airlines. Solving the Bertrand game, the solutions for prices are: 
 




Notice that the above expression of p1 is the price paid by passengers, while the price 
Ryanair receives is equal to p1 +(1-H)k.  
The model could also picture a situation with n LCC’s on the market, each one with 
half of the low quality demand, yi = y1 = (p2 - ap1) /n(a-1), and selling at the same price, p1, 
as their services are homogeneous. First, each airline maximises its profit, p p p pi, resulting a best 
reply function for each one of the LCC’s. Solving these functions the result is the best reply 
function to the FSC, and it is exactly the same than the one with only one LCC. Then, the 
presence of other LCC’s does not lower p1, and so does not benefit passengers. It only lowers 
the LCC’s demands and profits. If there were no vertical differentiation, or if the FSC was not 
in the market, the presence of another airline would bring the price down to marginal cost, as 
it is known from standard oligopoly theory.  
As the local community owns the airport, it may be supposed that this one pays the 
subsidy. Then the airport receives an amount of kHy1 as landing and handling charges, for 
which it has a cost of D per passenger. Supposing that each passenger spends an amount of P 
euros in concession activities, the airport’s profits may be written as p p p pA = (P+kH-D) y1. 
In order to establish some results presented below, it is convenient to develop the 
monopoly situation before the entry of the LCC. In this case, there is only one airline, with 
quality q2=a. The consumer indifferent between buying or not a ticket can be expressed by:   10
vta-p = 0. The incumbent’s demand is y = 1-p/a, where p is the ticket price. Monopoly profits 
are: p p p pm = ((1-p)/a)(p-H-C).  
Next some propositions will be presented as the answers this model provides for the 
questions stated in section 1. To avoid unnecessary complications resulting from adding more 
variables, the subsidy will be denoted by a fall in p1 whenever this is possible.  
 
Proposition 1: With the subsidy more passengers will fly. In particular, the LCC will 
capture demand from both the left and from the right side of the line along which consumers 
are distributed, thus reducing the high quality airline’s demand and gets new customers that 
did not fly before its entry. 
Proof: Recall that v0 q1 – p1 = 0 for the consumer who is indifferent between buying 
and not buying a ticket. As q1 =1,  v0 =p1.  The higher the subsidy is, the lower p1, and the 
greater the number of new consumers. 
As vt q1 – p1 = vt q2 – p2, then vt = (p2-p1)/(a-1). The best reply function of firm 2, p2 
=  (p1+C+H+a-1)/2,  is  upwards  sloping  with  (¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p2/¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p1=1/2).  When  p1  decreases  with  the 
subsidy, p2 is also reduced, but not so much as p1. Then vt moves rightwards meaning that 
less passengers will fly in the FSC. 
This result is according with Ryanair’s claim (49) of the Commission’s report and has 
some consistency with evidence provided by Ryanair and included in the same report. In the 
six Ryanair routes displayed in Table 3 the entry of the airline increased traffic. In four of 
these routes the increase was due both to new passengers and to a reduction in rivals’ demand. 
 





before  Total Ryanair's Others Difference
Ryanair routes Ryanair 2002 2002 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2)-(1)
Pisa 1065691 1654570 627985 1026585 -39106
Milan Bergamo 1061397 1252878 360389 892489 -168908
Pescara 114024 295875 196389 99486 -14538
Bologna 45933 150309 112508 37801 -8132
Liverpool 333000 2835088 252310 2582778 2249778
Derry 49000 199543 129298 70245 21245  11
Source: European Commission (2004) and own calculations 
 
Other evidences confirm this result. Franke (2004) when analysing the three major 
errors in FSC’s first perception of LCC’s, shows that LCC’s attract passengers who would not 
have flown otherwise (on the left side of the consumer’s line) as well as regular clients of  
FSC’s, including business class travelers (on the right side of the line).  
 
Proposition  2:  In  a  vertical  differentiation  competitive  setting,  the  incumbent  is 
negatively affected by the subsidy. However, if equilibrium price p1 was so low that the 
entrant  could  not  compete  in  the  incumbent’s  cost  conditions,  this  latter  would  not  lose 
profits. 
Proof:  It  is  trivial  to  show  that  the  FSC  is  affected  by  the  subsidy.  As  stated  in 
Proposition 1, with the subsidy y2 falls, as well as p2, due to the reduction in p1.  
In fact, p p p p2 = (p2(p1)-H-C)y2(p1, p2(p1)) =  p p p p2 (p2(p1),y2(p1, p2(p1)). 
The subsidy causes a fall in p1. The total change in p p p p2 due to this fall is: 
 ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p p p p2 /¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p1 =¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p p p p2 /¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p2 ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p2 /¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p1 +¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p p p p2 /¶ ¶ ¶ ¶y2(¶ ¶ ¶ ¶y2 /¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p1+¶ ¶ ¶ ¶y2/¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p2 ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p2 /¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p1) 
There is direct effect through p2, which is pushed downwards by the fall in p1, and an 
indirect effect through y2. On one hand, y2 is reduced by the fall in p1, but the negative 
reaction of p2 pushes y2 upwards. The net result is that y2 is smaller, as shown in the precedent 
proposition. Computing the other derivatives with the best reply function, p2 = (p1+C+H+a-
1)/2, and the expression of y2, the total change in p p p p2 is: 
D D D Dp p p p2 =¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p p p p2 /¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p1 = (p1+(a-1)-H-C)/2(a-1).  
The total change must have a positive sign, ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p p p p2 /¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p1 >0, or p1 >H+C-(a-1). The new 
entrant must be able to set a price that can be higher than the incumbent’s unitary costs 
deduced of a quality differential measure, a-1. Thus it could have profits without a subsidy 
higher than a-1. If the new entrant could not compete with the incumbent at the same costs, 
and still set the price equal to p1, or if p1+(a-1)<H+C, then ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p p p p2 /¶ ¶ ¶ ¶p1 <0 and the FSC would 
not be affected by a subsidy.  
 
Proposition 3: The incumbent has lower profits and this is due both to the entry of the 
LCC and to the subsidy. In particular, it will be more affected by entry than by aid if the 
subsidy per passenger is smaller than a certain amount that depends on the quality and the 
profit margins differential.    12
Proof:  First  it  is  necessary  to  prove  that  monopoly  profits  are  higher,  or  that the 
incumbent is affected by entry. This is straightforward without product differentiation but 
needs a confirmation for the vertical differentiation case.  
Recall that monopoly profits are p p p pm = ((1-p)/a))(p-H-C). Profits of the high quality 
airline, after the entry of the LCC are p p p p2 = ((1-(p2-p1))/(a-1))(p2-H-C), where  (p2-p1)/ (a-1) = 
vt. It is assumed that the LCC enters with a lower price, or that p>p1 and that the incumbent 
lowers  its  price,  so  p>p2.  But  vt  =  (p2-p1)/(a-1)>p,  as  shown  is  Proposition  1.  Then  (1-
p/a)/a)(p-H-C)> ((1-(p2-p1)/(a-1))(p2-H-C), or p p p pm > p p p p2.   
The second part of the proposition states that, under certain conditions, the incumbent 
may be more affected by the entry of the LCC. Let p1 and sp1 be the equilibrium prices, 
without  and with  the  subsidy, as well as  p p p p2 and  p p p p2
S the incumbent’s profits in the same 
situations.  
The  total  difference  in  profits  can  be  divided  in  (p p p pm  -  p p p p2)  and  (p p p p2  -  p p p p2
S),  that 
correspond, respectively, to the loss of profits due to the LCC entry and due to the subsidy. 
Then (p p p pm - p p p p2
S ) = (p p p pm - p p p p2 ) + (p p p p2  - p p p p2
S). 
Taking the expressions of profits: 
(p p p p2  - p p p p2
S) = (p2-H-C)(1-s)p1/(a-1), and 
(p p p pm - p p p p2 ) = (1-p)/a)(p-H-C)-((1-(p2-p1)/(a-1))(p2-H-C) = (1-p/a)M-(1-vt) M2, where 
M and M2 are monopoly and duopoly profit margins. Then, (p p p pm - p p p p2 ) >(p p p p2  - p p p p2
S) if (1-
p/a)M-(1-vt)M2 > (p2-H-C)(1-s)p1/(a-1).  
Recalling that the subsidy per passenger is (1-k)H, and taking the equilibrium price of 
the LCC, the above inequality may be written as: (1-k)H < D(D D D Dm (1-v0
m)-(1-vt)), where D is 
a measure of the quality differential, D = (a-1)/2a (4a-1),  D D D Dm is a measure of the profit 
margin differential D D D Dm = M/M2, and v0
m is the quality evaluation of the consumer indifferent 
between buying one ticket or none in the monopoly situation.  
The limit value of the subsidy, D(D D D Dm (1-v0
m)-(1-vt)) depends negatively on D if a is 
not too small (a>1.87). Then, the larger the monopoly margin and the quality differential, the 
larger the amount of aid that makes the incumbent more affected by competition than by the 
subsidy.  
 
Proposition 4: The secondary airport may be more benefited by the aid than the low 
cost airline.   13
This is one of Ryanair’s claims, stated in point (52) of the Commission’s report. In 
what conditions may the airport’s profits exceed those of the LCC? 
If   p p p pA > p p p p1 it must be: (P+kH-D)y1 > (p1-kH-bC)y1, or P+2kH-D> p1-bC. Then the 
airline must set a price, p1, which is lower than P+2kH+bC-D. As the airline margin, p1- kH-
bC, must be positive, the condition (P+kH-D)y1 > (p1- kH-bC)y1 is verified if P+kH-D > 0, 
which means that the airport must at least have positive profits, even paying the subsidy. 
Ryanair’s claim is true if the airport can be competitive at the fees it actually receives from 
the airline, or if these fees plus concession revenues exceed its costs. It all depends on the 
airports efficiency, on its ability to attract consumers to concession activities, and on the 
amount of the subsidy. The higher the two firs items, the higher may the subsidy be. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
This empirical analysis intends to get some insights on the nature of competition that 
LCC’s departing from secondary airports face. 
As it can be seen in Table 1, some secondary airports are dominated by one airline and 
some are not. Beauvais, Charleroi and Skavsta have doubtlessly a majority of Ryanair flights. 
Conversely, Stanstead and Milan Bergamo are airports where Ryanair’s share of flights is not 
so important. 
This empirical analysis intends to investigate the effects on airlines’ fares of departing 
from (or arriving at) a dominated or a non-dominated airport. If an airline is the only user of 
the airport it may behave as a monopsonist and ask for lower aeronautical charges. In the case 
of the model analysed in the preceding section, charges were lower by means of subsidisation. 
If a secondary airport serves a large number of LCC’s and none of them has a significant 
share of flights, it may charge higher aeronautical fees.  
As the airports’ charges are not divulgated, the prices to consumers (tickets’ fares) are 
used as a proxy. Then, it is to expect that in dominated airports aeronautical charges are lower 
and that this is transferred to consumers by means of lower fares. 
Competition is another variable that may explain fares. In monopolised routes airlines 
are expected to charge higher fares. A different but more interesting issue is the way LCC’s 
set  their  pricing  strategy  when  they  face  competition  from  FSC’s  or  from  other  LCC’s. 
Apparently,  it  should  be  expected  that  prices  are  lower  when  another  LCC  is  a  rival. 
However, and recalling the result presented in Section 2, the presence of another LCC in one 
particular route does not change the price.   14
The empirical analysis includes 42 routes of the same airline, Ryanair, in order to 
avoid  differences  in  airline’s  pricing  strategies.  The  43  routes  included  one-way  flights 
departing from Beauvais, Charleroi, Dublin, Stanstead and Milan Bergamo. Routes between 
two dominated airports were excluded. The dependent variable, FARE, is the price of the 
ticket per kilometer flown. This procedure seems more adequate than using the distance as an 
independent variable, as it is often done
3.  
The variable SHARE represents the share of Ryanair’s flights in each airport and was 
used to distinguish departing points. According to the model, it is expected that this variable 
will have a negative coefficient, indicating that when a flight leaves from a dominated airport, 
the price is lower on account of lower aeronautical fees. 
Competitive conditions were assessed by NUMB, the number of airlines supplying 
flights in the same route. Code share agreements were excluded by considering only one 
airline for a code share flight. This variable should have a negative coefficient since more 
competition should push prices down. 
The dummy variable LCC was added to account for the competition from another low 
cost airline in the same route. It takes the value of 1 when there is at least one more LCC in 
the same route, and the value of zero when competitors are only FSC’s.  
Data was collected from airlines websites, on the same day, for departures one month 
ahead. Only regular fares were used. When more than one regular fare was displayed, the 
daily flights fares were chosen. Night  flights  are  usually less  expensive, but they do not 
compete so nearly with FSC’s flights.  
Results are displayed in table 4. LCC is not significant, indicating that Ryanair’s price 
strategy is not influenced by the presence of a near rival. This confirms the result of the model 
presented above. There may be more than one LCC in the market but the price does not fall 
on account of it. Of course that another LCC means less profits, and this matters for the 
airline. But for passengers it is enough that one LCC is flying in a particular route. In most 
cases, Ryanair was the first LCC to enter the market, so the newcomers probably adjusted 
their prices to Ryanair’s.  
All other variables are significant at 1% level. The variable SHARE has a positive 
sign, the opposite of what was expected. The airline charges higher fares when departing from 
a  dominated  airport.  If  it  happens  that  it  pays  lower  aeronautical  charges,  as  it  may  be 
expected, these lower costs are not transferred to passengers. If lower charges are subsidies or 
                                                
3 Some authors use the distance as an explanatory variable and find that fares always increase with the distance. 
As an example, see Oliveira and Huse (2004).   15
any forms of state aid, the region may be benefited, by means of more employment and 
revenues, but not passengers. 
 
Table 4: Regression results 
 
Variable  Coefficient 
Constant  236.57 
(T=3.91) 
SHARE  3.41 
 (T=4.77) 
LCC  24.09 
(0.514) 
NUMB  -46.94 
(T=-2.83) 
R





The variable NUMB has the expected sign. The presence of one more airline in one 
route makes the price per kilometer fall of 47 eurocents. Then, Ryanair sets fares according to 
the number of competitors, whoever they may be, LCC’s or FSC’s.  
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
The main findings of the paper point out the importance of competition of LCC’s, and 
not only of eventual subsidisation of secondary airports. In fact, FSC’s are negatively affected 
by  subsidies,  but  competition  may  affect  them  more.  Their  reply  should  be  turned  to 
restructuring their services, in order to be able to compete with LCC’s. A higher quality 
service is a possible answer. 
An  empirical  analysis  using  Ryanairs’  and  its  competitors’  data  suggests  two 
important facts on LCC’s pricing strategies. First, that the presence of at least one more LCC 
does not change the price the airlines charges to passengers. Second, that the domination of 
airports  and  consequent  benefits  on  aeronautical  charges  is  kept  by  the  airline  and  not 
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